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inently, birds (Yom-Tov 1980 Davies 2000) . For example, more than 230 species of birds are known to lay eggs in the nests of conspecifics (Eadie et al. 1998; YomTov 2001) . Increasing interest in this phenomenon over the past two decades has led to a plethora of studies examining the fitness consequences to parasites and their hosts and the ecological factors influencing the frequency of CBP within and among populations (Petrie and Møller 1991; Davies 2000) . Because conspecifics provide the only hosts for brood parasites, obligate parasitism cannot become fixed in a population. Further, the advantages of parasitic laying are likely to be greatest when the frequency of parasitism is low and many host nests are available containing few parasitic eggs; the advantages will decrease as frequency of parasitism increases and more host nests contain many parasitic eggs. Accordingly, fitnesses are likely to be frequency dependent, and several game theory models have been proposed under which CPB could persist in an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS; May et al. 1991; Eadie and Fryxell 1992; Nee and May 1993; Maruyama and Seno 1999a; Robert and Sorci 2001; Ruxton 2002, 2004; Ruxton and Broom 2002) . Less well appreciated are the possible roles of CBP in population dynamics and vice versa. In several species, parasitic egg laying appears to be strongly influenced by the availability of resources essential for breeding. For example, in many hole-nesting birds, parasitism is more frequent when population density is high, nest sites are limited, and many host nests are available (Haramis and Thompson 1985; Eadie 1991) . Similar relationships with density occur for colonial-nesting species and for species concentrated on islands (Lank et al. 1990; Lokemoen 1991; Lyon and Everding 1996; Waldeck et al. 2004) . High levels of CPB in turn may lead to increased levels of nest desertion and reduced hatching success of eggs or fledging success of young (Haramis and Thompson 1985; Sherman 1986, 2001; Semel et al. 1988; Eadie 1991; Eadie et al. 1998 ). Few models have considered CBP and population dynamics together, but those that did suggested that CBP could lead to fluctuating or unstable population dynamics (May et al. 1991; Eadie and Fryxell 1992; Nee and May 1993) . Indeed, Semel et al. (1988) suggested that high levels of CBP, exacerbated by high densities of nest boxes placed in close proximity, could result in population crashes in the cavity-nesting wood duck (Aix sponsa). Theoretical and empirical work in other systems highlights the fact that evolution shapes the traits affecting population dynamics, and population dynamics define the relative fitnesses on which evolution acts, so neither process can be fully understood without the other (Kokko and LopezSepulcre 2007) .
In this article, we show that the impact of CBP on population dynamics, in terms of population equilibrium and stability, depends on why and how parasitism occurs. In particular, scenarios with higher parasitism can give either more stable or less stable dynamics, depending on the model, and a factor such as value of a parasitic egg may affect dynamics differently in different models. Investigating the role of CBP on population dynamics leads to several modeling challenges. First, we want to build on existing theory about evolution of CBP, but that theory involves diverse models with different biological considerations and modes of parasitism. Therefore we begin by reviewing the theoretical literature with the aim of developing as a starting point a general model based on existing models of the three major types of parasitism that have been proposed, defined below as best-of-a-bad-job, separate-strategies, and joint-strategies parasitism.
We then incorporate population dynamics and density dependence into the general model and develop four specific cases. For each case, we examine the interactions between parasitism, equilibrium population size, and stability. For continuous strategy variables, we use the adaptive dynamics framework, which generalizes evolutionarily stable strategies to evolutionarily singular strategies that may be dynamical attractors (convergence stable) or branching points for simple evolutionary models (Eshel 1983; Christiansen 1991; Waxman and Gavrilets 2005) . Most adaptive dynamics research considers only univariate traits, with exceptions such as work by Abrams et al. (1993) , Dieckmann and Law (1996) , Leimar (2005) , and Brown et al. (2007) . For model 4 below, we show that when total reproductive effort can evolve (constrained by adult costs of reproduction) in addition to parasitism strategy, the population dynamics consequences of CBP are qualitatively different than when only parasitism strategy evolves. Thus, while this article's primary focus is on the role of CBP in population dynamics, it also extends theories of evolution of CBP. While our models do not cover all potentially important aspects of parasitism, they represent a synthesis and generalization of many ideas in the literature.
Biology and Models of CBP
At least 17 studies have developed models to examine the evolutionary dynamics of conspecific brood parasitism from an ESS perspective. Table 1 summarizes some of the  major features included in these models, while key results  of each model are described in table A1 in the online edition of the American Naturalist. Three major types of brood parasitism have been considered. In best-of-a-badjob (BOBJ) parasitism, a parasitism strategy has lower fitness than nesting but is used by females who cannot breed otherwise, typically due to nest site limitation. In separatestrategy models, females either nest or parasitize but not both, and the strategies may have equal fitness under ESS conditions so that parasites are not just females who cannot obtain a nest site. An ESS of separate-strategy parasitism (separate ESS) can occur if, when parasitism frequency is low (or zero), an individual could obtain higher fitness by parasitizing than by nesting (Eadie and Fryxell 1992) . Here the term "separate strategy" is the same as the "mixed strategy" of Eadie and Fryxell (1992;  there distinguished from BOBJ parasitism) and the "professional" parasitism of Nee and May (1993) . In joint-strategy models, the same individuals may nest and also parasitize other nests. In an ESS of joint-strategy parasitism (joint ESS), an individual must find it advantageous to trade some of its potential nest eggs for parasitic eggs it could lay in other nests, which may also increase the survival of its remaining nest eggs. Most of the studies summarized in table 1 consider only a single type of parasitism.
Biology Included in Existing Models on Evolution of CBP
The possibility of CBP increases not only the range of conceivable reproductive strategies but also the range of factors that may influence relative fitness between strategies, as reflected in various models (see table 1 for citations). Without CBP, evolution of reproductive effort involves trade-offs between quality and quantity of offspring as well as costs of reproduction. With CBP involved, there may also be trade-offs between laying one's eggs parasitically or in one's own nest and between nesting at all or reproducing completely parasitically. Each of these could potentially have different quantity versus quality trade-offs and costs of reproduction, although a full combination of possibilities would make a quite complicated model and has not been treated. Most models either assume fixed clutch sizes for each strategy or include one trade-off such as a cost of reproduction or a trade-off between own-nest and parasitic eggs.
For birds, offspring value typically depends on brood size, an effect included in most models. Parasitic eggs may be inherently less valuable (i.e., have lower fitness) than host eggs, a parameter that has been included in many models, but a dependence of laying order on offspring value has been included in only two models. The relative fitness of nesting versus parasitism may depend on the Andersson 1984) . Most recently, Pöysä and Pesonen (2007) considered variation in predation risk among nest sites and the potential influence of spatial bet hedging (cf. Rubenstein 1982; Bulmer 1984) . These studies provide important directions for adding further complexity and realism to models of CBP, but they are outside the scope of our model. In summary, existing models are diverse and not easy to synthesize.
Results of Existing Models on Evolution of CBP and Population Dynamics
A common result of most of the models summarized in tables 1 and A1 is that under specific sets of conditions, CBP can invade a nonparasitic population and be evolutionarily stable. Hence, the original suggestion of Andersson and Eriksson (1982) that CBP could exist as an ESS has now been validated using several different modeling approaches. However, of all the models summarized in table 1, only three explicitly consider the population dynamic implications of CBP. May et al. (1991) modeled populations comprising three types of strategies: vigilant hosts (that reject parasitism), naive hosts (that accept parasitism), and parasites. Population dynamics depended on the cost of vigilance and egg laying activity of parasites. Cyclic oscillations of the three strategies were possible, leading in turn to unstable and cyclic total population size. Nee and May (1993) also focused on the interplay between population dynamics and evolutionary stability. They give scenarios in which it is impossible to have both population dynamical stability and evolutionary stability. Finally, Eadie and Fryxell (1992) explored the interaction of frequency dependence and density dependence in maintaining CBP as a mixed (i.e., separate) ESS. With nest limitation and random nest choice by parasites, high levels of CBP could destabilize population dynamics.
These three studies provide interesting early results about CBP and population dynamics, but they are limited in several ways. They consider much less general models than the one developed here and give less general analysis. For example, model A of Nee and May (1993) assumes fixed clutch sizes and ejection of one host egg per parasite egg (so that brood size effects are not important), omits considerations such as joint strategies (their model B includes joint strategies but is limited to an informal graphical analysis) and costs of reproduction, and is formulated in specific rather than general terms. Here we ask the question of how different types of CBP can affect population dynamics stability. For simplicity, we incorporate density dependence such that its interaction with ESS parasitism levels is small.
Our Models
We examine the evolutionary stability of parasitism and its effect on population dynamics for several specific cases of a general model that includes many biological aspects of the separate models listed in table 1. First we introduce the general model and its assumptions, with parameters summarized in table 2. Then we give additional assumptions for the specific cases. The general model can lead to BOBJ, separate-ESS, and/or joint-ESS parasitism, although in the results presented here only one type of parasitism is considered in each specific case.
The general model allows two types of strategy, nesting and non-nesting. The nesting strategy allows eggs to be laid both in one's own nest (nest eggs) and in other nests (parasitic eggs), while the non-nesting strategy allows only parasitic eggs. The nesting strategy involves total reproductive effort of T, split between C n nest eggs and C p /t non-nest eggs. Therefore each nest egg can be traded for t parasitic eggs, and , with . The trade-off
parameter t may be greater or less than 1 depending, for example, on how much effort is required to find nests to parasitize and whether production of nest eggs is limited by ability to feed them versus physiological limits in producing them. The fraction of parasitic eggs that are not rejected (killed) by the host is h. The value of a parasitic egg relative to a nest egg, given that each survives the nest, is g, and in the specific cases we assume .
The population fraction of non-nesters is p, each of which produces C p parasitic eggs. If non-nesters have equivalent physical state to nesters, then it is reasonable to assume , the maximum parasitic eggs that even C p tT p Fraction of adults using a parasitic strategy (derived for each model) g
Offspring value of a parasitic egg relative to a nester egg from same nest, 0 ! g ≤ 1 h
Probability that a parasitic egg is not rejected by host (1 in all models) F n Fitness of nesters
a nester could produce. Alternatively, C p could be greater or less than tT depending on the costs and benefits of building and using a nest. Non-nesting may occur either as a separate strategy ESS or as a BOBJ strategy if there is nest limitation. Parasitic eggs may be distributed either evenly or randomly among nests. It is assumed that parasitic eggs from nesters and non-nesters follow the same distribution and that the parasitic eggs of one parent are not aggregated in one or more nests. Survival rates of nest eggs and parasitic eggs are S n (C n , y, w, N) and S p (C n , y, w, N), respectively. These each depend on the numbers of nest eggs (C n ) and parasitic eggs (y), the vector of laying orders or other random factors for each egg (w), and total adult population size (N). The random variables for parasitic eggs per nest that are not rejected by the host and for laying order are Y and W, respectively, with realized values denoted y and w, respectively. In the specific models below, we use Poisson distributions for Y and do not include W.
To implement a particular model for W, the general equations (1) and (2) below are still valid, but one would need to consider specific models for laying orders in more detail .
Finally, adult survival may either be constant or depend on reproductive strategy (costs of reproduction) and/or N (density dependence). For a non-nester, dependence on reproductive strategy is via C p , while for a nester it is via T and/or C n . It would also be possible for adult survival for a nester to depend on the number of parasitic or total eggs it has raised. For nesters, a strategy is defined by either C n , if there is no adult cost of reproduction and hence T can be assumed fixed at a physiological maximum, or by (C n , T), if adult cost of reproduction creates a trade-off between total reproductive output and adult survival. To formulate fitness in an adaptive dynamics framework, define ( ) as the resident strategy of an entire population r r C , T n and ( ) as an invading strategy of a mutant individual.
The fitness of an invading nester strategy in a population playing a resident strategy is
The three terms in this equation correspond to offspring from a nester's own nest, offspring from parasitically laid eggs, and adult survival, respectively. The expected value in the own-nest term is the average survival (per nest) of the nest eggs across all random values of parasitic eggs per nest and laying orders. The average survival of parasitic eggs (per egg) that are not rejected is calculated as the average number of parasitic eggs that survive per nest divided by the average number of parasitic eggs per nest. (This is the average survival of a randomly chosen parasitic egg in the population rather than the average survival of parasitic eggs in a randomly chosen nest.) In all expectations, the distribution of Y incorporates parasitic eggs from both non-nesters and nesters (using the resident strategy) that are not rejected at laying. The benefit to the invading strategy of parasitic eggs is multiplied by their relative value (g) and the probability that they are not rejected (h). Finally, adult survival of a nester, A n , may depend on reproductive effort and/or adult population size. For non-nesters, fitness is given by
where A p is adult survival for non-nesters. The average fitness in the population is
p n
The population dynamics are given by
In equation (4), F has been rewritten F(N(t)) to emphasize that average fitness depends on population size via equations (1) and (2). Several aspects of model formulation (1)- (2) deserve comment. The model is closely related to the general model of Broom and Ruxton (2004) , which was formulated to understand the evolution of CBP rather than its effects on population dynamics. The model here includes rejection of parasite eggs by hosts, density dependence, and non-nesters, which are all omitted by Broom and Ruxton (2004) . Their model includes random numbers of nester eggs in their own nest, which is omitted here simply to avoid extraneous notation. Including that feature in our model would be straightforward, accomplished by redefining C n as reproductive effort for a nester's own nest, which determines the distribution of nest eggs laid, and by adjusting the expectations accordingly. Both models are formulated with general notation for laying-order effects that are not used in specific cases. We included general notation (W) for laying order effects to highlight its potential role in frequency dependence .
The model of Robert and Sorci (2001) is a subset of our model, with , no density dependence, no adult t p 1 cost of reproduction or random laying order, and a nonrandom distribution of parasite eggs. The model of Eadie and Fryxell (1992) formulates the expected value of parasitic egg survival in a different but equivalent way than (1)-(2). They formulate it as the expected per-nest survival for all eggs in the population except one parasite's eggs, with that parasite's eggs added for each term in the expectation. This gives the same result as (1)-(2) but would be slightly trickier to implement numerically if the distribution of eggs involves over-or underdispersion, such as a negative binomial.
Perhaps the most important biological considerations omitted from our model are ejection of host eggs by parasites as they deposit their eggs and trade-offs between egg quality and quantity. It would be straightforward to include ejection of host eggs abstractly in (1)- (2), but that could lead to a complicated stochastic process for a specific case. Including trade-offs between egg quality and quantity would also be straightforward to formulate, but that would lead to additional strategy variables that are beyond the scope of this article.
Analysis
Analysis of model (1)- (2) involves up to three types of stability: evolutionary stability of the fraction of nonnesters, for which nester or non-nester are discrete strategies; evolutionary stability of the continuous strategy variables C n and/or T among nesters; and population dynamics stability. These could be intertwined in general, for example, with the evolutionary equilibria and stability of nesting strategies affected by population dynamics parameters and vice versa. In the specific cases here, such dependencies are minor, so analysis of each type of stability is presented separately. Although C n , C p , and C p in reality must be integers, we allow them to be real (continuous) numbers for mathematical convenience.
Stability of Non-Nesting Fraction
An equilibrium of the fraction of non-nesters, p * , is defined as the value of p such that (noting that F n F p F n p and F p are both functions of p and assuming C n , T, and N fixed). It is a stable equilibrium if
This condition states that if an infinitesimally larger fraction of the population than p * adopts the non-nesting strategy, the fitness of nesters would be greater than that of non-nesters, so some of the non-nesters would have higher fitness if they nested, decreasing the non-nesting fraction back to p * .
Stability of Joint Nesting-Parasitism Strategy Variables
Next we introduce evolutionarily singular strategies and stability for the nester strategy variables, C n and/or T. Conditions are given here for C n when T is fixed, and the multivariate conditions for (C n , T) are given in appendix B in the online edition of the American Naturalist. If there is no adult cost of reproduction, then T will be fixed at a maximum effort; even if there is no benefit to laying additional nest eggs, laying any possible parasitic eggs will always be favored if there is no cost. Then . An evolutionarily singu-
This means that individual fitness is at an optimum at when the resident strategy is also at . The i * * C p C C n optimum is a local maximum and therefore is stable to invasion of nearly similar strategies, if
The final condition involves the direction of the selection gradient if the resident strategy deviates from . The * C singular strategy has convergence stability if (Eshel 1983; Christiansen 1991) . This states that if the resident strategy increased infinitesimally from , then the * C slope of fitness with respect to an invading strategy, evaluated at the resident strategy, would be back toward . *
C Population Dynamics Stability
Finally, a population dynamics equilibrium, , is defined * N by or . The equilibrium is stable * * *
This condition states that if a deviation from equilibrium leads to a larger deviation at the next time step, either in the same direction or by overcompensation in the opposite direction, then the equilibrium is not stable. The Ϫ1 boundary is of interest here because values of less than Ϫ1 can give oscillatory dynam-(Ѩ/ѨN )G(N )F * NpN ics. In interpreting results about population dynamics stability, it is important to interpret all values of the stability condition, , rather than focusing solely (Ѩ/ѨN )G(N )F * NpN on the boundary values (Ϫ1 and 1) and the bifurcation from stable equilibrium to cycles at Ϫ1. Values of that are closer to 0 will give quicker re-(Ѩ/ѨN )G(N )F * NpN turns to equilibrium, that is, greater resiliency, than values farther from 0. In the specific cases below, parameters have been chosen to be biologically reasonable and to highlight changes in the stability condition by including a bifurcation (crossing Ϫ1). However, other parameters in each model give similar results for the stability condition even if it does not cross Ϫ1. In addition, effects of CBP on equilibrium population density are potentially as biologically important as effects on stability.
Interactions among Stability Conditions
In general, one could consider the evolutionary and population dynamics stability conditions all together. For example, if a model admits both separate strategies and joint strategies, then are the joint, variable singular strategies stable to perturbations in the fraction of non-nesters? Interactions with population dynamics could also require some assumptions about trait inheritance and plasticity. For example, in a joint-strategies model, if a stable ESS solution is a function of population density N, then one could consider different assumptions about how the strategies track population size. In the specific cases analyzed here, such complications are minimal. Only one type of strategy is considered for each model. For models 1-3, the strategy results are independent of N. For model 4, the strategy results depend on N, but the results about CBP and dynamics are unaffected by this dependence, so we assume the strategy variables are optimized for equilibrium population size.
Assumptions Used for Specific Cases
Next we give assumptions and specific functions used in the following cases.
1. A parasitic egg has the same effect on brood survival as a host egg. This is reasonable because once a parasitic egg has been adopted in a nest, its impact on factors such as food per nestling and attraction of predators could be similar to host eggs.
2. Laying order does not affect offspring survival. 3. In the BOBJ and separate-strategies model, given reproductive effort T, nesters lay eggs and parasites C p T n lay eggs. C p tT p 4. The effects of density dependence and brood size on offspring survival occur independently on a log scale. This means that each effect contributes a factor to the offspring survival function, and those factors are multiplied. For models 1-3 below (with no cost of reproduction), this assumption decouples strategy optimization from population size. In general, optimal clutch size could depend on population size, and our simpler assumption represents a step toward more complex modeling in the future.
5. Brood survival is a negative exponential function of brood size, which may differ for nest eggs and parasitic eggs:
where L is either n or p; S 0 is a constant maximum survival, set to 1 in all cases; m n and m p are coefficients for the effect of brood size on survival for nest eggs and parasitic eggs, respectively, with in all cases and m p 0. 
For a large number of nests, the Poisson distribution is essentially identical to the binomial distribution. This assumption makes parasitism less favorable because parasitic eggs are disproportionately in large broods, which have lower survival.
Specific Cases and Simulations
Each model was implemented numerically, and the equations were solved for equilibrium population size, parasitism rate, and stability conditions. All evolutionary equilibria were stable, with one subtlety for model 4 described below, so they are evolutionarily plausible. Parameters for each model, including ranges of g and t values, were chosen to make the models comparable while elucidating differences between models in the role of parasitism on population dynamics. The results are interpreted comparatively rather than as specific numerical predictions because the models do not incorporate all aspects of bird ecology.
Model 1: Nest Limitation and BOBJ Parasitism
The BOBJ parasitism model by definition requires nest site limitation. This model makes sense only if parasitism is inferior to nesting for at least some individuals. For BOBJ parasitism, every non-nester favors some reproduction over none and so will parasitize if possible. We consider a BOBJ model with (in addition to the parameters specified above) no joint strategies allowed ( ); constant C p T n adult survival that is lower for non-nesters than for nesters (such as if non-nesters are inferior competitors), A p n , ; no effect of adult density on offspring sur-0.4 A p 0.2 p vival ( ); and equal brood survival for nest and parb p 0 asitic eggs, . In comparison to models 2-4, the m p m p n assumption of no adult density effect amplifies the role of nest limitation in regulating density. The maximum number of nest sites is , and the fraction of non-H p 100 nesters is
The range of g and t values for model 1 was such that parasitism is never favored over nesting at equilibrium population density.
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Model 2: Separate-Strategies Model
For separate-ESS parasitism to occur, non-nester fitness must be greater than nester fitness at low frequency and also must be frequency dependent such that at low frequencies non-nesting is favored and vice versa. For the separate strategies model, we assume that adult density affects brood survival ( ), there is no nest site b p 1/200 limitation (no BOBJ parasitism), and we do not allow joint strategies ( ). Then the frequency dependence must C p T n affect the difference between the expected survival of nest eggs in equation (1) and the expected survival of parasitic eggs in equation (2). This could occur if for any reason the difference between S n and S p depends on the fraction of non-nesters, p. For example, if later laying order decreases survival and parasitic eggs are disproportionately laid later, and if this effect is stronger when there are more parasites, frequency dependence would result. In the model of Eadie and Fryxell (1992) , frequency dependence arose from the randomness of the parasitic egg distribution. Parasitic eggs are disproportionately in large broods to an extent that depends on p. This effect occurs in the model here, but here the frequency dependence it generates is weak; if we replace the exponential brood survival model with a linear model, then variance in parasitic eggs per nest generates stronger frequency dependence (results not presented).
For a generic model of frequency dependence, model 2 here assumes that parasitic eggs are slightly more sensitive to brood size than are nest eggs, (a very m p 0.15 1 m p n small difference), which could arise as a type of quality or laying order effect. Adult survival is the same for nesters and non-nesters, . A p A p 0.5 n p
Model 3: Joint-Strategies Model with No Adult Cost of Reproduction
Like the separate ESS, a joint ESS requires frequency dependence in the fitness difference between laying nest eggs and parasitic eggs. However, in the joint-strategies model, the same individuals can lay nest and parasitic eggs, so frequency dependence arises automatically and does not require the mechanisms described for model 2. Model 3 is identical to model 2 except that joint strategies are allowed; brood survival is the same for all eggs, ; m p m p n and adult survival is . For this model,
smaller values of t and g (than in model 2) allow evolution of parasitism. No parameters were considered for which a separate strategy would be favored (assuming it has the same adult survival and other parameters).
Model 4: Joint-Strategies Model with Evolution of Total Reproductive Effort
Model 4 includes an adult cost of total reproductive effort, with an intercept of and slope of so Q p 0.8 k p 0.05 that C n and T must be jointly optimized. Preliminary results with other parameters that were the same as for model 3 gave a sharp transition from low parasitism to complete parasitism. When parasite egg value g and the trade-off between nest eggs and parasitic eggs t are both low, no parasitism occurs, and T is essentially the only strategy variable to maximize fitness. When g and t are large enough, parasitism is favored, T increases to its maximum possible value (such that adult survival is 0), and nearly all reproductive effort is parasitic. Based on these preliminary results, we added more frequency dependence to model 4 in the same manner as in model 2, m p p , to generate a larger range of stable parasitism 0.15 1 m n levels.
Results
In the BOBJ model (model 1; fig. 1 ), as parasite fecundity increases, the equilibrium population size de-C p tT p creases because the reproductive success of all eggs is decreased by the large brood sizes due to parasite eggs. Lower equilibrium population size implies lower parasitism rate, so higher t leads to lower parasitism. Higher parasite offspring value g increases the fitness of parasites without affecting offspring survival, so it increases equilibrium population size and parasitism rate, but only slightly. Although higher t leads to a lower equilibrium population size and parasitism rate, it destabilizes dynamics, as shown by the bifurcation diagram. Meanwhile, parasite offspring value g has negligible effect on stability. These results are explained by the population dynamics map of N(t ϩ 1) versus ( fig. 2 ). Parasitism does not affect the popu-N(t) lation dynamics when , but for , higher t leads N ! H N1 H to a steeper negative slope in the population dynamics map around equilibrium, which is destabilizing.
For the separate-ESS model (model 2; fig. 3 ), parasitism increases as either t or g increases because these represent greater parasitism fitness. This leads to lower ESS fitness for both nesters and parasites and hence lower equilibrium population size. The impact of parasite offspring value g on parasitism rate is much stronger than in the BOBJ model, and its impact on equilibrium population size and stability are opposite to the BOBJ model. Also, unlike the BOBJ model, parasitism in the separate-ESS model affects the entire population dynamics map ( fig. 2) , with higher parasitism causing lower for any given . This N(t ϩ 1) N(t) flattens the slope of the population dynamics map at equilibrium and hence stabilizes dynamics. . Bottom left, same for stability condition (contours). When the stability condition is below Ϫ1, the model is unstable. Bottom right, for fixed g and different values of t, the model was run for many time steps, and the last 50 population sizes were plotted for that t. When the model has a stable equilibrium, the last 50 population sizes fall on the same point and appear as one point. When the model has an unstable equilibrium, the last 50 population sizes oscillate between two values, which appear as two points.
The joint-ESS model without costs of reproduction (model 3; fig. 4 ) has a stability picture that is more similar to the separate-ESS model than to the BOBJ model, but it allows parasitism for lower values of g and t than does the separate-ESS model. In model 3, if the entire population uses a strategy that is entirely nesting ( ), C p D n then a single individual that shifts some reproduction toward parasitism experiences three effects on its fitness. The offspring survival of all of its remaining nest eggs is increased by having a smaller total number of eggs in the nest, it gains the reproductive output from its parasitic eggs, and it loses the output of the eggs not included in its own nest. Since T has been set at the optimal value for nesting alone, the loss of an egg from its own nest is worse than the gain of increased survival for the remaining eggs. However, the gain from parasitic eggs-even if each is worth less than nesting eggs-can make parasitism advantageous. As t increases, making parasitic eggs easier to produce, the ESS rate of parasitism increases, net fitness decreases, and hence equilibrium population size decreases.
Like the separate-ESS model, the entire population dynamics map ( fig. 2 ) is less steep, so the population dynamics are stabilized. Although the flattening of the population dynamics map is similar between models 2 and 3 with regard to t, the role of parasite offspring value g on population dynamics stability differs between these models. For both models, higher g favors higher parasitism, but for model 3, this actually increases average fitness and thus destabilizes the population dynamics.
The joint-ESS model with costs of reproduction (model 4; fig. 5 ) gives yet different results. Qualitatively, the results are more similar to model 2 than model 3, but with different parameters values and for different reasons. For N(t) ), which crosses each population dynamics map at its equilibrium population size. When the slope of the population map crosses the identity line with slope steeper (less) than Ϫ1, the equilibrium is unstable. model 4 there is a relatively narrow range of g and t over which sharp changes in strategy are predicted. For larger values of g and t, total reproductive effort increases to its maximum value of 16 (giving zero adult survival), and the fraction of reproduction invested in parasitic eggs increases. In all cases, higher parasitism gives lower fitness and hence lower equilibrium population size and higher stability. The lower elbow in the bifurcation (stability) subfigure arises when the T reaches its maximum value as t is increased. The sensitivity of results to g and t, which are not subject to evolution in the model here, suggests that the evolutionary trade-offs shaping them, in terms of quality versus quantity and reproductive effort, could play an important role in CBP evolution and population dynamics.
A subtlety in stability of the evolutionary dynamics arises for model 4 (app. B). For parameters where the ESS solution involves intermediate levels of reproductive effort and parasitic effort, the convergence stability conditions are satisfied, but the invasion stability condition is neutral in the T direction, suggesting that some distribution of strategies centered at the ESS may be supported. This result is not troubling for the overall analysis (one could assume slight curvature in A n to achieve complete stability), but it points to the potential for further interesting results if heritability of strategies is modeled explicitly.
Discussion
Our results show that one cannot easily or simply predict the effect of CBP on population dynamic stability without knowing more about how parasitism actually occurs. Nev- for parasitism rate (contours). Bottom left, same for stability condition (contours). When the stability condition is below Ϫ1, the model is unstable. Bottom right, for fixed g and different values of t, the model was run for many time steps, and the last 50 population sizes were plotted for that t. When the model has a stable equilibrium, the last 50 population sizes fall on the same point and appear as one point. When the model has an unstable equilibrium, the last 50 population sizes oscillate between two values, which appear as two points.
ertheless, some general predictions do emerge from the models here. When CBP is caused by nest limitation, parasitism increases the strength of density dependence caused by nest limitation, decreasing equilibrium population size and destabilizing dynamics. When CBP is not caused by nest limitation, it may increase or decrease average fitness. If parasitism increases average fitness, it also increases population density and decreases stability. If parasitism decreases average fitness, it also decreases population density and increases stability. While our model includes many biological considerations, the evolution and consequences of CBP are likely to be even more complex. For example, several models have included egg rejection behavior in relation to the degree of relatedness between hosts or parasites and to the ability to recognize kin (Zink 2000; Andersson 2001; Lopez-Sepulcre and Kokko 2002) . Empirical studies of such inclusive fitness benefits are mixed in their support (Andersson and Ahlund 2000, 2001; Pöysä 2003a Pöysä , 2004 Nielsen et al. 2006; Waldeck and Andersson 2006) , but evidence is increasing that host-parasite interactions among conspecifics may be more complex than considered in many existing models of CBP. Recent work by Pöysä and colleagues demonstrates that, in at least some species, parasites are able to assess the relative safety of nests with respect to the risk of nest predation and differentially parasitize safe nest sites (Pöysä 1999 (Pöysä , 2003b (Pöysä , 2006 Pöysä et al. 2001; Pöysä and Pesonen 2007) . Pöysä and Pesonen (2007) included this factor and showed that selection for laying eggs in safe sites could have a strong influence on the occurrence and persistence of CBP. In addition to this spatial aspect of CBP, one could consider the temporal dynamics of reproductive seasons in more detail, including timing of nesting and egg laying. )/T, as a function of parasite eggs per nest t and g. Bottom left, same for stability condition (contours). When the stability condition is below Ϫ1, the model is unstable. Bottom right, for fixed g and different values of t, the model was run for many time steps, and the last 50 population sizes were plotted for that t. When the model has a stable equilibrium, the last 50 population sizes fall on the same point and appear as one point. When the model has an unstable equilibrium, the last 50 population sizes oscillate between two values, which appear as two points.
We suggest several questions for future empirical work, which can be biologically important in their own right. First, estimates of parameters in the model and differences between nesters and non-nesters or nest eggs and parasitic eggs would be fundamental for improved understanding. For example, do nest eggs and parasitic eggs differ in brood survival or in fitness if they do fledge? Are there different adult costs to laying nest eggs or parasitic eggs? Under separate parasitism, do nesters and non-nesters differ in reproductive effort and/or survival? Do parasitic versus nonparasitic species adopt different strategies of egg quantity and/or quality?
Second, from a behavioral ecological perspective, when and where is each type of parasitism (BOBJ, separate ESS, or joint ESS) most prevalent? To date, most studies on birds suggest a mix of BOBJ or joint-strategy parasitism Brown 1989, 1998; Eadie 1989 Eadie , 1991 Pinxten et al. 1991; Lyon 1993a Lyon , 1993b Lyon , 2003 Sorenson 1993; McRae and Burke 1996; McRae 1998; Ahlund and Andersson 2001; Ahlund 2005) . This is consistent with our model result that the separate ESS arises only if the joint strategy is assumed to be impossible in the specific cases considered.
Third, from a population ecological perspective, there is a remarkable paucity of studies examining the relationship between CBP and population density and dynamics. While a test of the full interplay between CBP evolution and population dynamics would be daunting (Kokko and Lopez-Sepulcre 2007) , narrower aspects of their relationship can be tested. For example, a handful of studies on a small number of species (mostly hole-nesting ducks) have reported significant impacts of CBP on nesting suc- )/T * . Bottom left, same for stability condition (contours). When the stability condition is below Ϫ1, the model is unstable. Bottom right, for fixed g and different values of t, the model was run for many time steps, and the last 50 population sizes were plotted for that t. When the model has a stable equilibrium, the last 50 population sizes fall on the same point and appear as one point. When the model has an unstable equilibrium, the last 50 population sizes oscillate between two values, which appear as two points.
cess (Jones and Leopold 1967; Heusmann 1972; Heusmann et al. 1980; Haramis and Thompson 1985; Sherman 1986, 2001; Semel et al. 1988; Eadie 1991; Eadie et al. 1998) .
Finally, we emphasize that the role of CBP on population dynamics may have practical, as well as theoretical, implications. If CBP does influence population stability, as our models suggest, and if the management of critical resources such as nest sites influences the frequency and intensity of CBP, as a number of empirical studies suggest (Semel and Sherman 1986 Semel et al. 1988; Eadie 1991) , then a deeper understanding of the linkage between CBP and population dynamics will be essential to develop effective conservation and management strategies for the growing list of species in which this intriguing behavior occurs (Eadie et al. 1998) .
